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We examine ways of funding higher education, comparing upfront tuition fees with graduate 
taxes. The tax dominates, as volatility in future income is transferred from risk-averse 
students to the risk-neutral state. However, a double moral hazard problem arises when 
students’ efforts to raise lifetime income and universities’ activities to improve teaching quality 
are endogenized. We show that graduate taxes reduce work incentives but provide 
incentives to improve teaching quality. Yet if tax revenues are distributed evenly among 
universities there is free riding. To solve this problem each university should be allocated the 
revenue generated by its own alumni. In addition, we demonstrate how a budget-balancing 
graduate tax would encourage more people to attend university than would the equivalent 
upfront tuition fee. 
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 1 Introduction
The funding of public university education is the subject of current debate
across Europe.1 In several countries including Germany, university courses
have traditionally been funded entirely by the state and discussion has fo-
cused on the introduction of tuition fees. In the United Kingdom, universi-
ties have been charging students tuition fees for the past decade but they are
not su¢ cient to cover the costs of education and there is much resistance to
increasing them beyond present levels. We acknowledge the pressing need
to have students participate in the ￿nancing of their studies. However, there
is signi￿cant risk involved in successfully completing a university course and
securing future employment. We therefore question whether upfront tuition
fees represent an e¢ cient funding model. The government in the United
Kingdom recently proposed a tax following graduation from university as
an alternative to tuition fees and the idea has since been embraced by the
leader of the opposition (Financial Times, 2010). In this article we con-
sider these two di⁄erent means of ￿nancing higher education from both the
students￿and the universities￿perspectives.
There is some previous literature on the issue of graduate taxes. Eaton
and Rosen (1980) demonstrate in their analysis that a linear income tax can
increase incentives for risk-averse individuals to invest in human capital.
When the returns to such investments are uncertain, the state e⁄ectively
takes on a part of the risk via the tax. Garc￿a-Peæalosa and W￿lde (2000)
build on this result, relating it to the funding of higher education. They
compare a graduate tax to loan schemes. The graduate tax is preferred to
student loans due to such insurance e⁄ects. It is also superior to general
taxation when equity in the economy as a whole is considered. Gary-Bobo
and Trannoy (2005) assume that wages are a function of learnable skill and
innate ability. The authors focus on tuition fees and analyze the decision to
study and student selection on the part of universities under this regime.
In our model, we compare a system of tuition fees with a proportional
graduate tax on future income. The state continues to fund the universities
up to a certain point. Beyond this point, the students are responsible for
￿nancing their education. When there is no moral hazard problem, we too
1For a survey of developments in higher education and an international overview of
funding models see The Economist (2005). For an introduction to the various forms of
university funding, see Barr (1993).
2obtain the general result that risk-averse students prefer the graduate tax,
as future income is volatile, and the risk-neutral state assumes part of this
risk via the tax. However, since students di⁄er in their abilities, highly able
students are likelier to prefer an upfront fee as they expect to pay more tax
than their less able counterparts later on.
We then introduce two levels of moral hazard into the model. First, we
allow future income to depend on costly, unobservable e⁄ort on the part of
graduates. Subsequently, we incorporate moral hazard with regard to teach-
ing quality provided by universities. We hence end up with a double moral
hazard problem, as has been analyzed in various contexts, for instance by
Cooper and Ross (1985), Demski and Sappington (1991), Romano (1994)
and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1995). We ￿nd that while a graduate
tax reduces the incentives for graduates to work hard, it also leads to higher
teaching quality as long as the revenues are shared among the universities.
The reason is that universities stand to pro￿t from the higher future in-
come of their former students (which they can a⁄ect by raising teaching
quality). However, if revenues from the tax are distributed evenly among
universities a free-rider problem exists. This problem can be solved if each
university is allowed to receive the revenues raised from the tax paid by its
own former students. In such a system, universities become stakeholders in
their students￿future careers. Each university has high incentives to im-
prove teaching quality as this increases its students￿human capital, in turn
leading to higher future wages and thus higher tax revenue, which bene￿ts
the university directly.
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we introduce the
basic model. In section three, we consider a reference case where teaching
quality is an exogenous variable. In section four we endogenize both grad-
uate e⁄ort at the workplace and the quality of teaching at university. In
section ￿ve, we determine whether a graduate tax or tuition fees would lead
to a higher number of school-leavers applying for a university degree course.
Section six concludes.
32 Basic model
We consider a country in which there are n equally sized publicly owned
universities. Let there be a continuum of students I = [0;1].2 Each stu-
dent i 2 I has constant absolute risk aversion r > 0 and utility function
u(w) = ￿e￿rw where w is the individual￿ s lifetime income. Students vary in
their ability, captured by the variable ai; abilities are normally distributed





. There are two periods in
the model. In the ￿rst period, the students attend university. In the second
period, each student (now a graduate) earns income which depends on his
human capital and some random component. The human capital of a grad-
uate is a function of his ability and the quality of the university education
q which we ￿rst treat as exogenously given. We assume that abler students
bene￿t more from a higher quality of education.3 Hence, the second-period
wage of individual i is
Wi = qai + "i





. We assume that "i and ai are uncorrelated. The
total cost of education is K. Our risk-neutral state provides B < K from
an education budget to cover part of this cost. To ￿nance the rest, the
state now faces a choice between an upfront tuition fee per student ￿ and
a proportional graduate tax on future income ￿. We make the reasonable
assumption that the future income of university graduates is su¢ cient to
cover the cost of their education
qma > K ￿ B: (1)
2We ￿rst assume that the population of students is of ￿xed size. In section ￿ve we
endogenize the decision to study at university and consider which form of funding would
lead to more applications.
3This is well in line with results from personnel psychology showing that in nearly all
jobs people with higher cognitive abilities build up more knowlege and skills than others
and do so faster. See for instance the discussion in Schmidt and Hunter (1998).
43 A reference case
We ￿rst consider the case where teaching quality is an exogenous variable.
The state￿ s budget constraint with a ￿xed fee ￿ is
Z 1
0
￿di = K ￿ B.
Hence, the budget-balancing ￿xed fee is given by ￿ = K ￿ B. When a




qaidi = K ￿ B.





We now compare the utility of an individual student i with ability ai under
the two systems. Given our assumption that students are risk averse with
constant absolute risk aversion the certainty equivalent of student i with a
￿xed fee is4
E [qai + "i ￿ ￿] ￿
1
2
r ￿ V ar[qai + "i ￿ ￿] (2)
and with a graduate tax it is
E [(1 ￿ ￿)(qai + "i)] ￿
1
2
r ￿ V ar[(1 ￿ ￿)(qai + "i)]: (3)
First, suppose that the state, having a utilitarian welfare function, selects the
system that maximizes the expected utility of students, taking into account
the distribution of abilities. Note that this corresponds to the choice of an
individual student acting under a ￿ veil of ignorance￿ , i.e. not yet knowing
his own individual ability. We obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 If the state maximizes the expected utility of the students it
will implement the graduate tax.
Proof:
4See for instance Wolfstetter (1999), p. 342.
5The graduate tax is preferred if (3) exceeds (2) taking into account that
abilities are normally distributed. Let ￿2
W = V ar[qai + "i] = q2￿2
a + ￿2
".
The graduate tax is preferred i⁄
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From the viability condition (1) we have that qma > K ￿ B. Hence, the
inequality always holds.
Note that the state here decides as an individual student would, were he
oblivious to his own ability. The reason that the graduate tax is preferred
to an upfront tuition fee is that through the tax, the risk-neutral state insures
the risk-averse students against uncertainty in their future incomes.
However, individual students typically will have information regarding
their abilities and may di⁄er in their preferences about the system. We
therefore investigate individual students￿preferences for one of the systems
when the state is only interested in balancing the budget and ￿nd:
Proposition 2 Students up to a threshold ability level b ai prefer the graduate
tax. Beyond this cut-o⁄ value, students of high ability ai > b ai prefer the
upfront fee. The threshold b ai is greater than the median (mean) ability ma.
Proof:
Student i will prefer the graduate tax if and only if (3) ￿ (2). This inequality
6is equivalent to
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From the viability condition (1) we have that qma > K ￿B. It follows that
the median student will also prefer the graduate tax ma < b ai.
The graduate tax still has an insurance e⁄ect from the perspective of an
individual student. But when abilities are known, this insurance e⁄ect only
covers the unsystematic ￿ uctuations "i. In addition, the tax redistributes
income from the abler to the less able students. Students of low ability
bene￿t more from the graduate tax. They will earn less in the future and
therefore have to pay less. However, very able students anticipate their
relatively high expected future incomes and would thus prefer to pay the
standard fee today in return for not having to subsidize the education of
others through their earnings later. Hence, if ai is large enough, the costs
from redistribution outweigh individual risk concerns.
Nevertheless, a student of median ability always prefers the graduate
tax. The reason for this is that the median student pays the same under
both systems in expected terms but still pro￿ts from the insurance e⁄ect of
the graduate tax. Hence, a median voter model would predict that majority
voting between the two systems lead to the choice of a graduate tax.
74 Moral hazard
In this section we compare the incentive e⁄ects of the graduate tax and
￿xed tuition fee on graduate e⁄ort at the workplace and on university pro-
vision of teaching quality. We start by analyzing the moral hazard problems
separately and then consider an integrated model.
4.1 Graduate moral hazard
In reality, income not only depends on the quality of a university education.
It also depends on a graduate￿ s e⁄ort once he or she is in employment.
We now modify our wage function to include the e⁄ects of graduate e⁄ort
ei, with convex cost of e⁄ort C (ei) = c
2 (ei ￿ e)
2, where e is the level of
voluntary e⁄ort provided by a graduate. We assume that the e⁄ects of
higher ability and higher e⁄ort complement each other:
Wi (q;ei;ai;"i) = (q + ei)ai + "i:
We obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 The ￿xed tuition fee provides higher work incentives for
graduates.
Proof:
The certainty equivalent with the tuition fee (2) now becomes









The student chooses the e⁄ort level that maximizes the above expression.
The ￿rst order condition is
ai ￿ c(ei ￿ e) = 0




8The certainty equivalent under the graduate tax (3) becomes










The student maximizes the above expression with respect to ei for a given
tax ￿. The ￿rst order condition is
(1 ￿ ￿)ai ￿ c(ei ￿ e) = 0




This is ￿ ai
c less than the e⁄ort exerted under the tuition fee.
Under the tax, graduates e⁄ectively only see (1 ￿ ￿) of the income they
generate. With the ￿xed fee they remain residual claimants on their income.
They thus choose to work less hard compared to the situation with a ￿xed
tuition fee.
4.2 University moral hazard
So far we have assumed that teaching quality is exogenous. However, it
is quite likely that universities￿e⁄orts to improve teaching quality are also
a⁄ected by the mode of ￿nancing higher education. We model this by as-
suming that revenues from the upfront tuition fee and graduate tax are to be
shared equally among the n universities and that each university can a⁄ect
the teaching quality provided.
Each university j 2 f1;2;:::;ng can expend e⁄ort to increase its teach-
ing quality qj, investing more in the human capital formation of its stu-
dents. The (non-monetary) cost of e⁄ort of the university sta⁄is ￿(qj;sj) =
￿
2sj (qj ￿ q)
2, where sj denotes the mass of students educated by university
j and q represents the basic teaching quality provided voluntarily by the uni-
versity, regardless of any external incentives.5 We assume that the teaching
cost parameter ￿ is greater than the workplace cost parameter c since ￿ is a
per-capita measure.6 Universities are risk-neutral. Furthermore we assume
5For simplicity, we have assumed that cost of e⁄ort in teaching quality is linear in the
number of students. In reality these costs may be concave due to economies of scale. Note
that since we have a continuum of students I = [0;1] and n universities with an equal
number of students, sj =
1
n 8j.
6It should not be the case that it cost an individual more to generate a wage increase
9for simplicity that the distribution of student abilities is the same at each
university and that universities are of equal size. Finally, we assume that
each university is interested in maximizing its budget taking into account
the e⁄ort costs of raising teaching quality.
With a centrally determined upfront fee, the universities have no in￿ u-
ence on revenues through teaching quality. As such, each university simply
seeks to minimize its cost of e⁄ort. It hence chooses qj = q and the system
provides no additional incentives to raise quality. Under the graduate tax,
the universities choose e⁄ort so as to maximize their revenue, net of the cost









































sj (qj ￿ q)
2 :
The ￿rst order condition yields
1
n
￿sjma ￿ ￿sj (qj ￿ q) = 0




The universities have a stake in providing a better quality of teaching under
the graduate tax as they will bene￿t from the surplus revenues generated
through increasing the future wages of their students.
Note the classic free-rider problem among universities. As each univer-
sity is allocated an equal share of total tax revenue, the marginal revenue
from improved teaching quality is lower, the more universities there are (the
higher is n).
Yet there is a straightforward solution to this problem: universities
should be allowed to collect tax directly from their own alumni. To analyze
this formally, note that in this case the optimization problem of university
through higher direct workplace e⁄ort than it costs his university to achieve the same















sj (qj ￿ q)
2 ;
with ￿rst order condition
sj￿ma ￿ ￿sj (qj ￿ q) = 0




Clearly, the quality provided is higher under the direct collection system
than when the graduate tax is shared equally among the public universities.
Hence, we can conclude:
Proposition 4 When universities set their teaching quality endogenously,
graduate taxes provide better incentives for universities to invest in their
students￿ human capital than do ￿xed tuition fees. These incentives are
even stronger when each university receives the tax revenues directly from
its own former students.
Thus, such a system would make universities stakeholders in the career suc-
cess of their students. Universities that ￿nd e⁄ective new ways to increase
their students￿human capital are able to share the gains.
5 Decision to study at university
In the previous sections students account for the whole population. In this
section we relax this assumption, allowing for only a subset of the population
to study and focusing on the decision of a school-leaver to apply for a place
at university. We again compare the graduate tax with upfront tuition fees
and determine which system leads to a higher number of applications.
Let there be a continuum of school-leavers I = [0;1] contemplating
whether or not to take a degree course at university. School-leaver i is aware






For simplicity, all school-leavers who decide against a university degree will
attain a certainty equivalent of w0, irrespective of their abilities. But if
school-leaver i decides to study, the second-period graduate wage is
Wi = qai + "i






sents a random component of future income unbeknown to the school-leaver
at the time of applying for a place at university.7 We again assume that "i
and ai are uncorrelated. Suppose now that the per capita costs of educa-
tion are equal to ￿. Furthermore, we assume that the state can screen the
applicants and can set a minimum ability level amin as a precondition for
admission.
With a tuition fee ￿, a school-leaver will apply for university if
E [qai + "i ￿ ￿] ￿
1
2
r ￿ V ar[qai + "i ￿ ￿] > w0











With a graduate tax ￿, a university education is chosen if
E [(1 ￿ ￿)(qai + "i)] ￿
1
2
r ￿ V ar[(1 ￿ ￿)(qai + "i)] > w0













In the case of a ￿xed tuition fee, the state can cover its costs by setting
￿ = ￿, regardless of the number of students. With the tax rate, however,
voluntary enrolment will not necessarily lead to a balanced budget when the
tax rate is small. But the state can always limit enrolment by imposing an
appropriate minimum ability requirement.
We now show that more school-leavers will apply for university if the
state implements a budget-balancing graduate tax. To see this, we ￿rst
consider a situation in which the state imposes a ￿xed fee ￿ = ￿ on all
students. In this case, the marginal student, i.e. the one whose ability is
just su¢ cient to warrant a university education rather than employment
7To reduce the complexity of analysis, we revert to exogenous teaching quality and the
basic-model wage that is independent of workplace e⁄ort.







Now suppose instead that the state sets a graduate tax rate ￿0 leading to
exactly the same expected payment by the marginal student as this fee, i.e.






























































which is always true. Hence, the number of applicants will increase when
moving to a graduate tax and imposing this tax rate.
Now we consider the e⁄ect of the tax on the state￿ s ￿nances. Recall
that by de￿nition, the state always breaks even with the budget-balancing
￿xed fee. With the tax, the state earns less when students of lower ability
choose to enrol. However, costs can be controlled by limiting enrolment and
choosing a threshold ability for admission amin 2 [a￿;a￿]. The expected




































13Note that the ￿rst term of this expression (7) is strictly positive. This is
due to the fact that with the tax the state collects more money than it
spends from all the students who would rather enrol with the fee; although
these students would prefer the fee, they continue to enrol with the tax. On
the other hand, at the tax rate ￿0, the state subsidizes those students with
ability levels below a￿. Still, it is always possible to ￿nance such a subsidy
out of the additional revenues collected from the more able students. The
state simply sets a minimum ability requirement amin which guarantees that
it does not lose money from implementing the graduate tax. The budget-
balancing threshold amin is strictly smaller than a￿. To see this, note that
the budget surplus (7) is strictly positive at amin = a￿ and decreases as the
admission threshold amin is lowered.
Hence, we conclude:
Proposition 5 By replacing a budget-balancing tuition fee with a graduate
tax, enrolment can be increased without violating the budget constraint.
There are two reasons for this property of the graduate tax. The ￿rst
is risk aversion; the tax reduces the risk of uncertain returns from studying
and in turn increases the school-leaver￿ s willingness to study. This can be
seen by comparing the certainty equivalent of the marginal student paying
the tax with the alternative certainty equivalent when paying the fee; the
former is always higher than the latter:
E [(1 ￿ ￿)(qa￿ + "￿)] ￿
1
2
r ￿ V ar[(1 ￿ ￿)(qa￿ + "￿)] >
E [qa￿ + "￿ ￿ ￿] ￿
1
2































The second reason for more school-leavers applying with the graduate
tax than the ￿xed tuition fee is price discrimination. The tax results in
higher prices for those students with a higher willingness to pay due to their
higher abilities, and lower prices for others who are less able with a lower
willingness to pay.
146 Conclusion and outlook
We have compared ￿xed tuition fees to a graduate tax as a means to fund
higher education from the perspective of students of di⁄ering ability. Ap-
plying a utility function with constant absolute risk aversion we were able
to show that for risk-averse students, a graduate tax is generally preferable
as it insures against ￿ uctuations in future income. We then allowed for uni-
versities to invest in teaching quality and for income to depend not only on
this quality but also on graduate e⁄ort at the workplace. We showed that
while the tax is a disincentive for workers to generate income themselves, it
acts as an incentive for the universities to improve the quality of education.
A key ￿nding is that the tax is most e⁄ective when paid directly by gradu-
ates to their former universities. In this way, it is possible to overcome the
free-rider problem which exists when the state shares tax revenue equally
among universities.
One may ask what the e⁄ect would be of having tuition fees collected
directly by universities. In our model, there are only two periods and the
fee is paid only once, thus there would be no direct incentive for universities
to increase teaching quality. Were the model extended to more periods
or an overlapping-generations setup, long-term reputation considerations
would become relevant and implicit incentives would be created. However,
reputation would always be built on past teaching quality; the incentives
would not be as immediate as those created by the graduate tax scheme.
Barr (2004) advocates a system of loans with income-contingent repay-
ments, which has similar properties to the graduate tax in our analysis. We
consider just two systems. Although our students di⁄er in their innate abili-
ties, we do not di⁄erentiate between rich and poor students and do not look
into grants and loans. Hence, the issue of equity based on initial endow-
ments of wealth does not arise in the model. This might be incorporated via
an interest rate that varies between students with respect to their ability to
borrow money to pay the upfront fee. Nevertheless, when we endogenize the
decision by school-leavers whether or not to apply for university, our analy-
sis demonstrates that a graduate tax would allow a larger proportion of the
population to study than the equivalent upfront tuition fee. This is due to
the tax exacting price discrimination on the market for higher education in
addition to its insurance properties.
15Finally, alumni donations seem to play an increasingly signi￿cant role in
￿nancing higher education.8 Such voluntary contributions presumably arise
through graduate preferences for fairness and reciprocity. An interesting
extension to the model may thus be to consider the e⁄ect of universities
anticipating such preferences on their incentives to improve teaching quality.
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